The US Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision which overturned the leading case from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit regarding induced infringement under 35 USC § 271 (b), but left open the question as to the so-called 'single actor' rule for direct infringement.
another entity.
The Supreme Court accepted Limelight's petition, and eventually denied Akamai's petition, with an express instruction to the Federal Circuit that it could reconsider the issue of divided infringement under 35 USC §271(a) on remand.
Facts
The parties Akamai was the sole licensee of a patent for a method of delivering electronic data using a content delivery network. One step of the method included designating components to be stored on specific servers or 'tagging' the components. Limelight provided a similar service, delivering electronic data via a content delivery network. Limelight required its customers to tag the components they intend to store, rather than doing the tagging itself. Limelight did, however, perform the other steps required by the method claim. Akamai IV reasoned that enforcing a 'single actor' rule creates a regime that allows parties to 'knowingly sidestep infringement liability simply by arranging to divide the steps of a method claim between them', and to prevent this loophole, the performance of steps by multiple parties must enable induced infringement.
The District Court decision

Petitions for certiorari
Limelight and Akamai both filed petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Limelight's petition focused on the 35 USC §271(b) induced infringement issue. Akamai's petition focused on the 35 USC §271(a) issue. The Supreme Court asked the US Solicitor General to weigh in on the dispute. The Solicitor General recommended that the Court grant Limelight's petition for certiorari and reverse the Federal Circuit's decision, but deny Akamai's petition because the Muniauction rule was correct.
The Supreme Court followed the Solicitor General's recommendation, granting Limelight's petition on 10 January 2014 and denying Akamai's petition only after the release of the opinion described herein.
Analysis
Justice Alito delivered the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court for Limelight holding that a party cannot be held liable for inducing patent infringement when no direct infringement had occurred. In rejecting Akamai's argument, Limelight disagreed with the rationale that tort law imposes liability on a defendant who harms another through a third party, even if the third party is not liable. Limelight reasoned that the major distinction between tort law and the circumstances in this dispute is not that the third party is not liable, but rather that no infringement was committed whatsoever. Specifically, if no single party undertakes all the steps in the patent, then the patent holder's rights have not been violated.
Limelight disagreed with the similar argument that sometimes, in tort law, liability can attach when multiple defendants inflict an injury. In particular, the court reasoned that Akamai's interests had not been 'invaded' because its patent has not been infringed and so there was no injury. The court also rejected Akamai's argument that the circumstances were comparable to the federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 USC §2. While recognizing that, in the past, the Supreme Court found a comparison between patent law and criminal law to be persuasive, Limelight distinguished these circumstances because it is inconsistent with the 1952 Patent Act's 'cornerstone principle that patentees have a right only to the set of elements claims in their patents and nothing further'.
Limelight rejected Akamai's argument that patent law principles indicated that Congress intended combined infringement to be classified as induced infringement. In so doing, the court observed that Muniauction may 'too narrowly circumscrib[e] the scope of § 271(a)' but compensating for that error by misinterpreting section 271(b) is not an acceptable correction.
Limelight acknowledged the concern that this ruling may create a loophole for infringers, but that the correct way to remedy that loophole is to address the direct infringement rule created in Muniauction. The Supreme Court chose not to address the substance of the Muniauction rule in Limelight because it was not briefed, and it was not the question presented. But Limelight left room for the Federal Circuit to reconsider the Muniauction rule on remand, or in a later case.
Practical Significance
The issue addressed in this case was squarely framed as whether divided infringement could constitute direct infringement and how the liability would be divided. The efforts to avoid addressing that squarely proved ineffective at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court level, but will, it is hoped, be addressed by the Federal Circuit on remand. 
